The concept of the 'failed state' emerged in the 1990s to describe and explain why states residing outside the Western world do not function as advanced states. The failed state narrative has inherent conceptual limitations and is based on flawed assumptions that obscure its utility. These so--called failed states are held against a Western--centric norm and a universalized spectrum of state development. The concept is now widely used in the context of global security, peacekeeping, poverty reduction, humanitarian assistance and good governance. The application of the narrative within the realm of policy means Western actors use the concept to promote their own security and development interests. This translates into an inability to formulate effective policy responses to society--wide challenges. This essay examines the failed state narrative by exploring how the state is theorized in the context of failed states, and how the narrative is plagued with neocolonial underpinnings, definitional ambiguity, western centrism and analytical reductionism.
The article was written only a year after the fall of Siad Barre's government in Somalia and was written largely in response to the lack of government stability in the Horn of Africa. However, as Aman Sium points out, it was written as a call to "reformulate American foreign policy in relation to formerly promote their own security and development strategies; this makes them useless in the realm of policy, given their inability to formulate effective policy responses to society--wide challenges. Policies flowing from the dominant narrative on failed states have often been narrow and generic prescriptions, in particular, one--size--fits--all state--building policies. This paper will take a critical look at the ways in which the notion of failed states is framed and emphasized by Western governments and international development actors, and how this narrative is problematic in that it is state--centric and ignores history and context.
Representing the Narrative
The failed state narrative attracted increasing attention during the 2000s after the concept began circulating among Western public administrations, international organizations, influential think tanks, and the media. The concept is now widely used by international actors in the context of global security, peacekeeping, poverty reduction, humanitarian assistance and even international trade agreements. Specifically, Western government actors and policy analysts have adopted the notion of failed states to label and rank a number of developing countries facing violence and conflict, political instability, severe poverty, and other threats to security and development.
8 Models used to represent failed state narratives are articulated in the form of tables, rankings, and indexes, as well as through the use of language, imagery, and analogies.
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The calculation of differential capacities to govern among the states of the world today is rendered seemingly objective and ahistorical by the empirical measurement of aspects of government capacity and function. among the top 7.
11 In such countries, it is assumed that enduring political tensions, lack of security and the inability of governments to provide political goods to citizens will impede self--reliant development and, thereby, pose a potential threat to regional or global security. In addition to the positive/negative sovereignty binary, failed states are also examined through their inability to provide political goods to their citizens. This approach, as represented by authors such as William Zartman and Robert Rotberg, sees the state first and foremost as a service provider.
22
Both authors distinguish between a variety of services that states may provide, ranging from "security to rule of law, the protection of property, the right to political participation, provision of infrastructure and social services such as health and education." 23 These services constitute a hierarchy where security is a condition for the provision of all other services. Hill outlines two common elements of this approach. First, the failed state is identified as "being either 'unable' and/or 'unwilling The lack of congruency between the ideal and reality is taken to indicate a lack, not in the concept, but in the object to which it refers. According to this approach, the absence of certain features associated with statehood constitutes an argument for changing the world to make it fit the concept of statehood. Hence, the policy manifestations of the failed state narrative are ahistorical, decontextualized, and based on a one--size--fits--all model. Eriksen warns that with this move, one moves away from the domain of theory as a tool of understanding and moves towards the realm of normative theory. 26 Branwen Gruffyd Jones identifies three characteristics of the discourse that determine its ahistorical nature and, thus, its inadequate explanatory power:
First is the enormous proliferation of descriptive terminology… This rich array of descriptors functions in a manner which appears self--evident, acting by way of tautology to form a substitute for historically informed social analysis and explanation… Second, 'state failure' is characterized as being primarily of local origin… The generic form of explanation locates the causes of 'failure' in terms of internal agency…with little serious regard to history, structure and the international. Third, the analytical/descriptive approach operates through Sium, 3. 46 Ibid., 3. 135
The categories of fragility and failed states cannot be isolated from the conditions under which they emerged and entered the Western political lexicon on issues like security and development. They were a product of the post--Cold War period, created by Western actors based on an attempt to advance new strategic options in security, defense, humanitarianism and international cooperation. It was also a key feature of the George Bush administration's policy discourse on the 'war on terror' by connecting the American foreign policy agenda with the new national security strategy launched after 9/11. 47 Additionally, the relationship established between state fragility, underdevelopment and security reflected the new development aid strategies pursued by major multilateral organizations. It helped those institutions representing Western countries' interests, especially the World Bank, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OCED) and IMF, to develop a new agenda towards non--performing countries after Western donors shifted towards performance--based allocation mechanisms for distributing development assistance.
48 Oliver Nay argues it is for these reasons that "the rhetoric on failed and fragile states cannot be dissociated from the Western powers' military doctrines, diplomatic options and economic choices." 49 It provides grounds for policy interventions to resolve regional conflicts, counter transnational terrorism and combat international organized crime, or for interference in the internal affairs of war--torn or poor countries. 50 The discourse on failed states becomes a policy narrative that serves to justify peace--building and state--building interventions which has contributed to the development of neocolonialism that involves international domination that no longer relies on the military conquest of territory, but instead results from the establishment, by the great powers and for a limited time, of governance systems that bring together international organizations, Western bilateral agencies and domestic authorities in countries rebuilding after 47 Nay, 330. 48 Ibid., 329.
49 Ibid., 330. 50 Boas and Jennings, 388.
conflict or disaster -such as Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and South Sudan. 51 The emergence of the failed state narrative has not primarily served the needs of populations suffering from war situations and poor governance. Instead, it mainly reflects strategic and financial concerns shared by a limited number of Western governments. It is a policy label "that fuels 'operational doctrines' on international security and development… and has been instrumental in the production of legitimate discourse in international relations." 52
Definitional Ambiguity
Another salient limitation of the failed state narrative lies in the inability of actors to agree on consistent criteria to define state fragility. These concepts are subject to a wide variety of uses and refer to diverse elements, depending on whether one is dealing with the efficiency of public administration, the legitimacy of government institutions, international and national security, or the well--being of local populations. Nay outlines several of the areas where these concepts are utilized to describe the incapacities and dysfunctions of state institutions; the domestic contexts marked by political instability, insecurity and violence; examining economic hardship and extreme poverty; problems of border security and uncontrolled transnational transfers (refugee flows, economic migration, terrorists networks, drug and arms trafficking); and lastly, they may refer to health risks and environmental threats. 53 Many scholars recognize the inherent vagueness of these concepts, but this has led to the proliferation of definitions each with an accumulation of diverse indicators. As a result, there are limitations in the analytical utility of the concept. Nay suggests that the use of the single term 'failed state' leads to "super--aggregation of very diverse sorts of states 51 Nay, 330. 52 Ibid., 330.
and their problems. The term is used in various indexes, each proposing specific institutional and social indicators to define 'state fragility' -such as in the 160 sub--indicators reported in the Fund for Peace's Failed States Index." 54 This approach allows for an infinite number of criteria, making the notion of a 'failed state' even more obscure. Additionally, the notion of a 'failed state' has become a catchall phrase. For example, according to the OECD, "States are fragile when state structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of their populations." 55 Nay points out this definition can be applied to a majority of developing countries. 56 Thus, further conceptual clarity remains elusive. Nay also notes, "this may be one reason that it gained such importance in the international policy discourse: the more extensive, porous and malleable the idea of state fragility, the more it could be appropriated and manipulated by policy actors and analysts with conflicting views and policy priorities."
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Western-centrism As discussed earlier, the failed state narrative is grounded in a Western--centric approach to social order and political stability. Priority is given to political institutions, internal security and legal order, state control over territory, the provision of public services and the regulation of social and economic life. States are also perceived as functioning entities and legitimate actors once they are able to function according to Western donor assistance standards or conditions. The notion that states can be divided into worthy and failed stems from the assumption that "all states can and should function in essentially the same way, and can therefore be located on a spectrum from good to Furthermore, the corollary of the assumption that states can and should function the same way ignores the issue of why these states function as they do. The narrative prescribes that failed states can be fixed using technocratic solutions, such as good governance programmes or institutional reforms. Boas and Jennings argue that these types of reform agendas are predicated on "the self--referential notion that modern, Western, 'liberal market democracies' are the normative goal, and that mimicking their structures is the only viable option to overcome the decrepitude that enables criminality, terrorism, and poverty to flourish."
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These flawed assumptions about state uniformity have produced narrow and generic policy prescriptions, in particular, and one--size--fits--all state--building policies.
Conclusion
The failed state discourse is ambiguous, one--dimensional and self--serving. This leads to a dissonance between the analysis of failed states and local realities. In a globalized world, it would be wrong to assume the factors causing political instability and extreme poverty in so--called failed states are confined to their national boundaries. The failed state discourse as it currently stands disregards the fact that many different pathways to failure exist: socio--cultural build up, colonial legacies and regional dynamics, among other factors all matter to varying degrees. Western leaders are keen to point at internal dynamics while refusing to recognize how international political economy and global power asymmetries shape states' abilities to deal with crises. The discourse is highly subjective and creates flexible labels that are loosely applied to different contexts. Actors such as development agencies, international financial institutions, think tanks, and states have produced a large number of case studies, typologies and highly sophisticated indexes to measure the fragility or failure of states.
There is a need for a more nuanced, more contextualized and dynamic approach to engagement with 'failed states.' International responses to such policy challenges should improve the state's institutional capacity and political will to perform functions necessary to meet citizens' basic needs. However, simplistic notions and catchall phrases that blur the understanding of multifaceted 58 Boas and Jennings, 477. 59 Ibid., 477.
historical situations in so--called failed states need to be abandoned. In cases where countries are affected by conflict, crises and poverty, the study of central government institutions should not be neglected as "corruption, clan divisions within the political system, political violence, lack of free elections, bad governance, weak capacity of public administrations and public debt..." 60 However, the analytical focus on state institutions creates an artificial division between political structures and society that tends to overlook specific socio--cultural contexts.
Alternatives that consider the question of state fragility as interdependent with questions of social vulnerabilities require the rejection of the analytical frameworks as they currently stand. It implies moving away from the construction of a policy narrative to meet policy demands and financial incentives of Western actors and moving towards a perspective grounded in social and political theory. This would involve exploring the factors contributing to the challenges faced by so--called failed states on a country--by--country basis that adopts context--based and historically grounded approaches. This entails moving away from the comparative approach that contrasts developing states to a static, ahistorical definition of the state based on Western values.
